End-of-2025 Update on Hong Kong Political Prisoners
The good news: hundreds released this year; the bad: hundreds more to go
This article is #18 in the Hong Kong Repression Monitor series which provides overviews of indicators of repression in Hong Kong, based on research and data collected from 2019 to the present. For more information, see this introduction, which also has a full list of articles in the series. A previous article from earlier this year provides an extensive overview of political prisoners in Hong Kong, while this article focuses on updates related to 2025.
UPDATED: This post was updated on December 29, 2025 to reflect the increase of three new political prisoners in the closing days of December.
For a change, the big story about Hong Kong political prisoners in 2025 isn’t how many are going in but how many are coming out. At the start of the year, there were 887 behind bars; by the end, 619.
New political prisoners in 2025
There were 27 new political prisoners in Hong Kong in 2025. Of course, 27 is 27 too many, but relative to previous years, the total was far lower: there were 153 new political prisoners in 2024; 483 in 2023; 376 in 2022; and 893 from 2019 to 2021, for a total of 1,932 political prisoners in Hong Kong from June 9, 2019 to the present.
In fact, it can be said that the years of mass political imprisonment have concluded.
All of the mass trials of protesters have finished. The political trials that have yet to conclude, of Jimmy Lai and co-defendants, Chow Hang-tung, Lee Cheuk-yan and Albert Ho, are of people who have been remanded in custody for years.
While the number of political arrests1 in Hong Kong in 2025 was more than double what it was in 2024—81 versus 31—, that number is still way down on previous years: 104 in 2023, 91 in 2022, 293 in 2021, and 10,202 from 2019 to 2020, for a total of 10,802.
If the current and recent rates of political arrests remain about the same or decline, the number of new political prisoners will remain at relatively low levels.
Released political prisoners in 2025
At least 295 political prisoners were released in 2025—about one-third of the 887 behind bars at the start of the year. And 295 released is an estimate based on expiration of sentences.2 Because many if not most non-“national security” prisoners will get a one-third sentence reduction for good conduct in prison, the number still in prison is in all likelihood lower than 619.3
Among those released were 14 of the HK45, who were imprisoned for participating in the 2020 pro-democracy primary election. The other 31 remain behind bars; eight will get out next year, the rest between 2027 and 2032.
The release of hundreds of political prisoners is undoubtedly good news, but it also presents significant challenges, both for those released and for their support networks. Topping the list of challenges are disorientation, lack of material resources, lack of work/jobs and/or educational opportunities, psychological difficulties, discrimination, and decisions to make in regard to their future. A key decision which many feel they must confront is whether to stay in Hong Kong or to leave. A common refrain of recently released political prisoners is that they see no future for themselves in Hong Kong; they no longer recognize the city, so much has it changed; and they don’t feel comfortable there. But at the same time, many feel they cannot afford to emigrate and have insufficient connections or contacts abroad to make such a new start feasible.
The regime has smashed most organizations that previously helped political prisoners, two of the most prominent being 612 Humanitarian Relief Fund and Wall-fare. Fortunately, informal networks of friends, families, neighbors, churches, pro-democracy small businesses and small humanitarian groups have ensured that the newly released receive the support they need, at least at a minimal level. Of course, a free, independent civil society would be able to provide far more solid and comprehensive support, but that’s not the current reality in the new authoritarian Hong Kong. If you would like to contribute to the support of recently released political prisoners in a way that is safe both for yourself, the organization involved, and beneficiaries and others in Hong Kong, Bonham Tree Aid is reputable and worthy.
With a couple hundred more political prisoners projected to be released next year, the resources of those who are helping the newly released will be even more strained. At least 222 are expected to get out in 2026. This would reduce the overall number of political prisoners behind bars to fewer than 400.
Remaining political prisoners
Of the 619 political prisoners still in custody, most are serving lengthy, multi-year sentences.
Seventy-eight percent—479—were convicted of “riot” for their participation in the 2019 protests. Most of their riot convictions occurred in 2022 and 2023, and since the typical “riot” defendant is out on bail pending completion of trial, they don’t even begin serving their time until their convictions, whereas most defendants facing explicitly political charges are remanded pending completion of trial, meaning that, if they are convicted, as almost all are, that time on remand counts toward time served. On the upside, those serving time for riot are generally eligible for the one-third sentence reduction for good conduct while in prison, unlike those convicted of crimes “endangering national security.”
Thirty-five current political prisoners are pro-democracy leaders. Most of them were convicted of “national security” crimes.
Still others with no public profile prior to their arrests were convicted of “national security” crimes and remain in prison, from Tong Ying-kit, the first person ever convicted under the CCP-imposed 2020 national security law, who is serving nine years, to Joseph John, a Portuguese national serving five years.
Special mention should be made of those on long-term remand pending the conclusion of Jimmy Lai’s trial: six Apple Daily executives who plead guilty in November 2022 as well as Andy Li and Chan Tsz-wah who plead guilty in August 2021. They have been waiting years now just to be sentenced.
We should work to raise the profiles of those still in prison. Jimmy Lai is already well-known. Others to focus on include:
Chow Hang-tung (still on trial, imprisoned since September 2021)
Lee Cheuk-yan (still on trial, imprisoned since September 2021)
Owen Chow (release date: November 2032)
Gwyneth Ho (June 2028)
Ventus Lau (August 2028)
Prince Wong (October 2028)
Joshua Wong (January 2027, but, as stated above, the regime arrested him again this year and appears intent on keeping him behind bars forever)
Leung Kwok-hung (release date: March 2029)
Lam Cheuk-ting (release date: November 2029)
There are other political prisoners who have signaled that they would rather not have people abroad prominently campaigning on their behalf.
Just this week, on International Human Rights Day, twenty-seven legal and civil society organizations called for the release of Chow Hang-tung and Lee Cheuk-yan, and the International Trade Union Confederation recently called for Lee Cheuk-yan’s release. This is good, but the public attention on their cases must be sustained, more organizations and individuals must join the demands for the release of Hong Kong political prisoners, and the media must take up the challenge of covering this issue with the attention it deserves, despite the Hong Kong government’s attempts to prevent everyone in Hong Kong from talking about it.
With some political prisoners not scheduled for release until the 2030s, even though the overall number of political prisoners is decreasing, the crisis of mass political imprisonment in Hong Kong will persist into the next decade, having already gone on for six years. We must do our best to continue to hold the regime to account as well as to act in solidarity until every single political prisoner is free, and now, more than ever, we must also support those who have been released.
My working definition of “political arrests” in the context of Hong Kong is: 1) any crimes under the national security laws of 2020 and 2024, the main ones being terrorism, secession, collusion with foreign forces, subversion (all in the 2020 national security law imposed on Hong Kong by the Chinese Communist Party), and sedition (a UK colonial-era law incorporated into Hong Kong’s national security legislation of 2024); 2) other crimes of an explicitly political nature such as “insulting the national anthem,” “insulting the flag,” and “inciting others not to vote or cast an invalid vote;” and 3) crimes which are not explicitly political in nature but have been used by the regime to target political opponents, making the prosecutions clearly political in intent to the vast majority of those familiar with the situation in Hong Kong. A brief but incomplete list of these crimes would be any used to prosecute protesters in the 2019 protests such as “riot” and “unlawful assembly,” as well as fraud, money laundering, criminal damage, and an array of others targeting those engaged in political acts or those regarded as political enemies by the regime.
While monitoring mechanisms of those entering prison are quite robust, largely based on court records in their trials, there is no systematic monitoring of releases of political prisoners. Since in most cases, whether or not a particular prisoner has received a sentence reduction for good conduct in prison cannot be confirmed, expiration of sentence becomes the default indicator of prison release.
In theory, those convicted of national security crimes are still eligible for early release, but in practice, up to now, there is only one case of anyone convicted of a national security crime being released early—Andrew Chiu, released earlier this year. The second national security law, imposed by the Hong Kong government in 2024, mandated that in cases of those convicted of national security crimes, the prison commissioner must certify that early release would not endanger national security. Of course, the prison commissioner is hardly in an authoritative position to make such a determination, and the result is that the commissioner errs on the side of caution and bars early release in most cases. Ma Chun-man was scheduled for early release days after the 2024 national security legislation came into effect; as a result, his early release was rescinded, and when he took the government to court over it, he lost.