What happened to China Labour Bulletin?

...suddenly shut down on same day the Hong Kong government announces a joint operation with the secret Chinese national security office in HK

Early on June 12, 2025, a statement (see above) appeared on the website of China Labour Bulletin. It said that CLB was dissolving. CLB was a civil society organization based in Hong Kong that since 1994 had worked on labor issues in China. It was founded by Han Dongfang, a worker and a leader of the Tiananmen protests in China in 1989, who, after the Tiananmen Massacre, turned himself in and, after a stint in prison, left China and came to Hong Kong, where he has remained ever since.

Then, at 22:12 in the evening of the 12th, the Hong Kong government issued the following statement.

It was the first time that the Hong Kong government had publicly acknowledged cooperation between the Hong Kong national security police (the National Security Department—NSD) and the Chinese national security office in Hong Kong (the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administration Region—OSNS) in an investigation or enforcement operation.

OSNS had been opened in Hong Kong following the Chinese Communist Party’s imposition of the national security law on Hong Kong on June 30, 2020. While Chinese security agents had always been suspected of operating in Hong Kong, the establishment of this office was the first time their presence had ever been made official and the NSL set the legal foundation of their operations. Still, almost nothing was known about OSNS or what it was up to. While, again, it was assumed to be closely coordinating with the Hong Kong government and police on so-called “national security” issues, the Hong Kong government had essentially never said a thing about it.

Then, on May 13 this year, the Hong Kong government enacted so-called “subsidiary legislation,” “subsidiary” because it was added to the national security law (the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance) promulgated by the Hong Kong government last year, on March 23, 2024. The subsidiary legislation primarily had to do with OSNS. Most relevant to the issue before us is that the legislation prohibits anyone who knows or suspects that the Chinese national security office in HK is handling a case “from disclosing to any other person any information relating to that investigation without reasonable excuse or lawful authority.” In effect, this makes it a crime for, say, the media to divulge anything about a case in which the Chinese national security office is involved or for anyone to talk to the media about it or directly say anything online.

The result is that the Hong Kong media appears to have muzzled itself to an extent previously unseen, even in these years when press freedom has precipitously declined and the media have to constantly be thinking about the “red lines” of the permissible. I read seven articles from Hong Kong outlets, pro-CCP to independent, about the “joint operation,” and they all said the same thing, quoting the Hong Kong government’s press release and not straying beyond it. Previously, even in national security cases, when the press got wind of an operation, they would often be on the scene photographing, as when Robert Chung, the head of Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, was brought to PORI’s offices by national security police in January as part of an investigation. This time, no press dared to even investigate whether there was a connection between China Labour Bulletin’s announcement of dissolution and the “joint operation.”

So, up to now, no one’s been able to confirm who the target of the joint operation was, though there is much speculation that it was CLB.

Around 10:30 am on June 13, CLB’s website went down and has not as of now (9:10 pm HK time) come back up. As its dissolution announcement said, its social media had already been taken down.

Even people who had been in regular contact with Han Dongfang were unable to reach him. The Central News Agency of Taiwan reported on the afternoon of the 13th that it had spoken with him. He simply confirmed that, as per CLB’s announcement, it had closed for financial reasons. He also said that he planned to continue living in Hong Kong. Beyond that, he refused to answer questions. Of course, it would presumably be against the law, according to the new “subsidiary legislation,” for Han to disclose that CLB is the target of OSNS enforcement operations, as it would for anyone else.

What the Hong Kong government’s press release reveals is this: a suspected case of “collusion with a foreign country or with external elements to endanger national security” involving “six persons and an organisation suspected of having committed the offence…between November 2020 and June 2024.” The NSD arranged interviews and the interviews were conducted by the NSD (the involvement of the OSNS in this bit is obfuscated). The homes of the six were raided as was the office of “the organisation” and “exhibits” were seized, “including bank documents, devices, etc.” The persons under investigation had to surrender their travel documents.

A confusing detail is that the press release says the organization’s office is in a commercial building in “Kwai Chung district.” First of all, there is no administrative entity known as Kwai Chung district. Kwai Chung is a neighborhood located in Kwai Tsing district. So exactly what is meant by “Kwai Chung district” is unclear. Secondly, CLB’s publicly advertised office was in Cheung Sha Wan, which is in Sham Shui Po district, the neighboring district to Kwai Tsing. Anyway you look at it, whether the government meant Kwai Chung or Kwai Tsing, Cheung Sha Wan is not located in either. That would suggest the target of the operation is not CLB. But a security guard at the building in Cheung Sha Wan where CLB’s office was supposedly located said that its office there had closed a month ago and a plaque at the door had been removed. Others have said they’d heard CLB had opened an office elsewhere, perhaps in Kwai Chung/Kwai Tsing.

The Hong Kong government press release does not mention any charges or arrests; it just says the investigation is on-going. That does not necessarily mean no one has been detained.

Beyond that, the press release raises many questions: why did they make the operation known? why did they mention the role of OSNS? why was OSNS involved in this particular case—is it because the investigated organization and persons have some connection to China? had this operation been planned for some time, but they first wanted to get the “subsidiary legislation” in place before conducting it? why were the targets suspected of “colluding with foreign forces;” what had they supposedly done? In national security cases that don’t end up in court, it is not uncommon that little to nothing is known of what the arrestees are suspected of having done, but usually a few scraps of information do come out. Here, nothing.

CLB stated openly on its now-shuttered website that it received funding from sources outside of China: “CLB receives grants from a wide range of government or quasi-government bodies, trade unions and private foundations, all of which are based outside of China. Some grants are for specific projects, while others cover CLB’s operating costs.” That alone could make it a target. The government press release notes the period covered by the investigation is 2020 to 2024, suggesting on-going activities rather than a single particular act or series of acts.

In a sense, it’s a wonder CLB managed to remain open for five years after the imposition of the 2020 national security law. Other groups that worked on rights issues in China, like China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group and Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China, either closed of their own accord (CHRLG) or were literally forced to shut down by the government (HK Alliance).

So, if indeed CLB was the target of the joint operation, it could be the regime is simply attending to unfinished business—remember, dozens of civil society groups in Hong Kong have closed due to state repression in the past five years. Or it could be that someone in the CCP with sufficient clout didn’t like the fact that a Tiananmen leader was not only living freely in Hong Kong but also running an organization there, especially given that since the beginning of the crackdown, the regime has sought to expunge any sign of commemoration of the 1989 protests and the massacre.

The CCP assigns to many groups it considers enemies the label “anti-China.” To my knowledge, CLB has never been called “anti-China.” It took a pragmatic approach to working on labor issues in China, right down to cooperating with the official, CCP-controlled labor union, the only one that’s allowed to exist. (There’s no such thing as an independent labor union in China, and the official union is tasked more with controlling workers than advocating on their behalf). At any rate, it does not appear that CLB has done anything in recent times to antagonize the regime, though its foreign funding and the mere fact that it worked from Hong Kong on issues in China may have been enough to put it in the regime’s sites.

At any rate, there is much about what little has emerged that is chilling: the sudden dissolution of CLB, which is not dissimilar to what’s happened to other Hong Kong civil society groups and media; the announcement of joint operations between OSNS and NSD, which is a precedent; the fact that Hong Kong media has confined itself to only reporting what the government has said; the fact that Han Dongfang spoke with one media outlet, in Taiwan no less, but refused to answer most questions; and, indeed, the fact that so little has emerged about the case. Perhaps more will in the coming days; perhaps it won’t. After all, where would the information come from when only the government has the right to speak?